From North Africa to Latin America and back: comparative findings and theoretical reflections by Weipert-Fenner, Irene & Wolff, Jonas
www.ssoar.info
From North Africa to Latin America and back:
comparative findings and theoretical reflections
Weipert-Fenner, Irene; Wolff, Jonas
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Sammelwerksbeitrag / collection article
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
Hessische Stiftung Friedens- und Konfliktforschung (HSFK)
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Weipert-Fenner, I., & Wolff, J. (2020). From North Africa to Latin America and back: comparative findings and
theoretical reflections. In I. Weipert-Fenner, & J. Wolff (Eds.), Socioeconomic protests in MENA and Latin
America: Egypt and Tunisia in Interregional Comparison (pp. 251-274). Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. https://
doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-19621-9_10
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY Lizenz (Namensnennung) zur
Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu den CC-Lizenzen finden
Sie hier:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.de
Terms of use:
This document is made available under a CC BY Licence
(Attribution). For more Information see:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
251© The Author(s) 2020
I. Weipert-Fenner, J. Wolff (eds.), Socioeconomic Protests  
in MENA and Latin America, Middle East Today, 
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-19621-9_10
CHAPTER 10
From North Africa to Latin America 
and Back: Comparative Findings 
and Theoretical Reflections
Irene Weipert-Fenner and Jonas Wolff
10.1  IntroductIon
Since the revolutions of 2011, the transformations of the political regimes 
in Egypt and Tunisia have taken different paths: In Egypt, under President 
Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, authoritarian rule is being restabilized, while Tunisia 
has undergone a gradual, yet fragile, institutionalization of democratic 
rule. Despite these divergent trajectories, some remarkable similarities 
characterize post-revolutionary developments in the two countries. Until 
2013, there was a tremendous increase in polarization between secular 
and Islamist forces, leading to serious political crises. In this context, issues 
related to socioeconomic development, social policies and economic 
reforms were largely marginalized within the political agenda. In both 
countries, the predominant state response during the first years after the 
revolutions was marked by pragmatic muddling through that refrained 
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from pursuing structural and/or redistributive reforms. Post-revolutionary 
governments in Egypt and Tunisia have been unable and/or unwilling to 
improve the socioeconomic situation of the general populace, and, as a 
result, the socioeconomic grievances that were key drivers of the 
2010–2011 uprisings have remained unaddressed (see Chap. 2, in this 
volume; Diwan and Galal 2016; IMF 2014; Kienle 2015; Paciello 2013).
As the studies compiled in this volume document, this overall dynamic 
of politico-economic development has had complex consequences for 
those actors that have continued to articulate socioeconomic grievances. 
But, taking the different case studies together, one general observation 
stands out: Key agents of socioeconomic contention, including move-
ments by organized labor and the unemployed that were important in the 
run-up to the uprisings and that saw their political opportunities open up 
in the immediate aftermath of the revolutions, have since been effectively 
marginalized as political actors. In this concluding chapter, we reflect on 
the causes of this weakness of socioeconomic contention by identifying 
comparative insights that emerge from the contributions to this volume 
and by situating them in the context of broader comparative and theoreti-
cal debates on the relationship between social movements and political 
change. More specifically, in what follows, we first discuss Egypt’s and 
Tunisia’s post-revolutionary trajectories from a comparative perspective. 
Second, we discuss these comparative findings in the light of experiences 
in Latin America. Third, drawing again on comparative scholarship on 
Latin America, we offer a theoretical interpretation of some of the main 
dynamics observed in Egypt and Tunisia. Fourth and finally, we conclude 
with some general implications and an outlook.
10.2  Egypt’s and tunIsIa’s post-rEvolutIonary 
trajEctorIEs: comparatIvE FIndIngs
With all the talk about the “revolutions” in Egypt and Tunisia, it is impor-
tant to start with acknowledging that the uprisings in 2010 and 2011 in 
the two countries do not even remotely correspond to what the compara-
tive literature usually calls “revolutions.”1 Certainly, the two countries 
have not experienced social revolutions, that is, “rapid, basic transforma-
tions of a society’s state and class structures” that “are accompanied and in 
1 For a comprehensive discussion of the (non-)revolutionary nature of the Arab uprisings, 
see Bayat (2017).
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part carried through by class-based revolts from below” (Skocpol 1979, 
p. 4). In the terminology used, for instance, in Skocpol’s classic study on 
the topic, the uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia could perhaps be considered 
political revolutions, which “transform state structures but not social struc-
tures,” and “are not necessarily accomplished through class conflict” 
(Skocpol 1979, p. 4). But, as Adly and Meddeb (see Chap. 2, in this vol-
ume) show, even this categorization overestimates the depth of structural 
change that followed from the toppling of long-standing dictators. Rather 
than directly touching upon state structures, the so-called revolutions in 
Egypt and Tunisia mainly concerned the shape and configuration of politi-
cal institutions, that is, the political regime.2 More specifically, what we 
could observe in the two countries in 2011 were protest-driven, negoti-
ated processes of regime transformation that involved attempts to con-
struct some kind of democratic rule (see Della Porta 2014; Heydemann 
2016; Valbjørn 2012).3 This particular type of politico-institutional trans-
formation, which can still be described as a political revolution based on 
the more general understanding of the term (Goodwin 2001, p. 4), serves 
as the “post-revolutionary” context in which the socioeconomic protests 
unfolded that have been studied in this volume.4
This specific characteristic of the revolutions at hand has crucial impli-
cations that run through the analyses presented in this volume and, in 
particular, concern the type of actors and alliances involved in contentious 
action. Very clearly, the correlations and alliances of actors that shaped the 
uprisings and their aftermath were not defined by socioeconomic (class) 
cleavages. Protest movements were decidedly cross-class (Della Porta 
2014, Chap. 3; Durac 2015). The terminology of the comparative study 
of revolutions, again, helps to clarify this point: While, as already men-
tioned, the results of the uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia can be called 
political revolutions (in a broad sense), the uprisings themselves were 
2 On the distinction between state and political regime, see, for instance, Fishman (1990), 
Goodwin (2001, pp. 12–13), and O’Donnell (1993).
3 In terms of the typology of “paths toward democracy” developed by Ruth B. Collier, 
Egypt and Tunisia roughly correspond to the pattern of “destabilization and extrication,” in 
which protest movements (in Collier’s cases, sustained by organized labor, in particular) 
“destabilized authoritarianism and opened the way for the establishment of a democratically 
elected government” (Collier 1999, p. 114).
4 In such a broader sense, Jeff Goodwin (2001, pp. 9–10) defines revolutions as “irregular, 
extra-constitutional, and sometimes violent changes of political regime and control of state 
power brought about by popular movements.”
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hardly driven by a network of actors that might be considered “revolu-
tionary movements,” that is, social movements that “attempt to gain 
 control of the state as such” (Goodwin 2001, p. 10).5 As almost all observ-
ers have noted, socioeconomic claims were significant in the emergence 
and spread of the uprisings, and actors that are defined by socioeconomic 
cleavages (such as labor organizations or the unemployed) played an 
important role in the dynamics of mobilization (see Chap. 1, in this vol-
ume). And, yet, no relevant sociopolitical force emerged from these pro-
tests that would promote anything resembling an agenda for socioeconomic 
change. This helps understand one key finding of the research compiled in 
this volume: the apparent paradox that uprisings that (a) have been driven, 
in particular, by socioeconomic grievances and related demands for social 
justice and that (b) have had sufficient strength to topple long-standing 
dictators, have (c) not led to any significant fulfillment of these socioeco-
nomic demands. But what are the implications of this mismatch between 
the claims and the actual outcomes of the uprisings for the post- 
revolutionary dynamics of contentious action?
In the immediate aftermath of the uprisings, many observers argued 
that a decisive question for the future of the ongoing political transforma-
tions in Egypt and Tunisia was precisely whether post-revolutionary gov-
ernments would be able to address “citizen demands for material 
improvement and social justice” (Burnell 2013, p.  84; see also 
Schlumberger and Matzke 2012, pp.  107–108). When we started this 
project, we therefore speculated that a lack of a substantive political 
response to socioeconomic grievances in Egypt and Tunisia would mean 
that socioeconomic protests would go on at a continuously high, if not 
increasing, level. In any case, we expected that the ways in which the 
emerging political regimes in Egypt and Tunisia “respond to socioeco-
nomic discontent are of crucial importance for [the] political transforma-
tion processes” (Weipert-Fenner and Wolff 2015, p. 1). These assumptions 
have not been disproven by our research, but the findings of this book do 
suggest a need for differentiation.
As the quantitative protest event analysis conducted by Prisca Jöst and 
Jan-Philipp Vatthauer shows, socioeconomic protests have not been a con-
tinuous phenomenon. The years between 2011 and 2016  in the two 
5 Goodwin, here, relies on Charles Tilly’s definition of a revolutionary movement as “a 
social movement ‘advancing exclusive competing claims to control of the state, or some seg-
ment of it’” (Goodwin 2001, p. 10, citing Tilly 1993, p. 10).
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countries have been characterized rather by passing outbursts of discon-
tent, most notably in Egypt in 2013 and in Tunisia in 2016. Since 2013, 
socioeconomic protests in Egypt have continued, albeit at a low level of 
intensity. Tunisia, by contrast, has witnessed a massive increase in socio-
economic protests since 2015, which, however, has also taken the form of 
temporary outbursts. In line with the political opportunity approach in 
social movement research, these dynamics of socioeconomic contention 
respond to the evolving political context rather than constituting a rele-
vant driving force of political change. Still, socioeconomic contention has 
proven relevant for economic policymaking: Arguably in response to pro-
tests, including the threat thereof, governments in both Egypt and Tunisia 
have increased public wages, the size of the public sector and general sub-
sidies (at least in the first years after the revolutions), while refraining from 
pursuing socioeconomic measures that would have had immediate nega-
tive effects on wage earners and self-, under- and unemployed people (see 
Chap. 2, in this volume; IMF 2014, pp. 8–11; Paciello 2013).
This overall finding is confirmed upon inspection of the key protago-
nists in socioeconomic protests in the two countries, namely organized 
and unorganized labor and, in Tunisia, unemployed people. In both coun-
tries, while labor organizations were relatively successful in defending cer-
tain benefits and rights, they were unable to achieve “positive” change. 
This holds true for both Tunisia, where the unusually strong and united 
national trade union federation Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail 
(UGTT) has mainly acted as a mediator, contributing to the contested 
process of political transition in the country (see Chap. 5, in this volume), 
and Egypt, where the main trade union federation remains under state 
control and the independent trade union movement has become increas-
ingly marginalized. Still, even in Egypt, independent trade unions success-
fully prevented parliament from adopting a new civil service law in early 
2016 that included reductions in public sector wages (see Chap. 6, in this 
volume). The protests by organized and ad hoc groups of unemployed 
people in Tunisia were also characterized by conservative demands. 
Actions by the national Union of Unemployed Graduates (UDC) and 
mobilizations in the Gafsa mining basin—a hotbed of socioeconomic pro-
test in Tunisia—have generally called for a return of the state as the guaran-
tor of decent jobs and welfare.6 Success, therefore, has basically meant 
6 A different dynamic, but with similar consequences, could be observed in the case of 
Egypt’s Tuktuk drivers studied in this volume by Abdelrahman Soliman. Here, also, the few 
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governmental assurances of a certain number of additional public sector 
jobs for the unemployed (see Chap. 8, in this volume). The case studies 
also revealed that the fragmentation of societal actors and their low levels 
of trust in political parties and institutions have contributed to the weak-
ness of socioeconomic protests (see Chaps. 6, 8 and 9 of this volume). The 
only exception is the Tunisian trade union federation, which has by and 
large been able to represent the country’s organized working class. Given 
its political role as a mediator guaranteeing Tunisia’s transition to democ-
racy, the UGTT has, however, largely refrained from actively making 
labor-related, socioeconomic demands (see Chap. 5, in this volume). In 
addition, even if it generally has a leftist profile, the UGTT has presented 
itself as a nonpartisan, “neutral” actor and, therefore, mostly refrained 
from forming alliances with political parties.
10.3  Egypt and tunIsIa In thE lIght oF latIn 
amErIcan ExpErIEncEs: IntErrEgIonal comparIson
As summarized in the two overview chapters by Jonas Wolff (see Chaps. 4 
and 7, in this volume), studies on the role and dynamics of social protest 
and popular mobilization during the processes of democratization in Latin 
America between the late 1970s and early 1990s have shown how socio-
economic claims, though important for mobilization against authoritarian 
regimes, were sidelined during actual regime change negotiations.
By and large, democratization in the region meant the establishment 
of, or return to, a political system with free and fair elections, representa-
tive political institutions and constitutionally guaranteed political and 
civil rights. It did not include any serious attempt to deal with the dra-
matic socioeconomic inequalities and the systematic disregard of social 
and economic rights with a view to improving the socioeconomic under-
pinnings of a more-than-formal democracy. Some observers have explic-
itly argued that things have to be like this: that in order to get the 
moderate (“soft”) members of the authoritarian regime coalition to sup-
port democratization, debates about economic redistribution and struc-
tural, socioeconomic change had to be avoided (see O’Donnell and 
Schmitter 1986, p. 27). Others have rather grudgingly accepted that this 
protests that took place were characterized by defensive and/or conservative demands on the 
state, basically aiming at the issue of licensing.
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is what happened empirically (see Bermeo 1990, p. 365).7 Be this as it 
may, the overall result is undeniable: Political democratization in Latin 
America succeeded in a context of persisting—if not actually worsening—
socioeconomic hardships and inequalities and, thus, did not actually pro-
duce socioeconomic benefits for the great majority of the respective 
population that was, formally, empowered by political change. Recalling 
the ways in which this general dynamic played out in the region as well as 
the explanations that have been developed in the comparative literature 
on Latin American democratization help us better understand the con-
temporary trajectories of post-revolutionary Egypt and Tunisia as sum-
marized earlier. This, in particular, concerns three key dynamics that can 
be observed in both contexts.
First, as mentioned earlier, in both sets of cases, we can observe that as 
soon as the struggle is over, and the negotiation of the shape of the politi-
cal regime takes center stage, questions concerning the economic order 
and socioeconomic redistribution are pushed aside in the political agenda. 
Theoretically, in the case of Latin America, this dynamic can be traced 
back to (a) the cross-class character of the pro-democracy movements and 
the relatively privileged status of the Latin American middle classes (includ-
ing the important segment of organized labor), which made the emer-
gence of a common agenda of socioeconomic change and, more specifically, 
widely shared claims for socioeconomic redistribution unlikely; (b) the 
elite-centered and negotiated (non-revolutionary) character of most tran-
sitions, which meant that incumbent regime forces and political, military 
and economic elites, in general, played an important role in shaping politi-
cal change; and (c) an international context that, by and large, supported 
this kind of limited, politico-institutional democratization (see O’Donnell 
and Schmitter 1986; Rueschemeyer et  al. 1992, Chap. 5; Wolff 2005, 
p. 61). The contributions to this volume suggest that these three factors 
are also relevant in the cases of Egypt and Tunisia. While (a) the cross-class 
character of the uprising and its consequences for the post-revolutionary 
dynamics of contention have already been highlighted, the ambivalent 
7 As Nancy Bermeo summarized the findings of the set of volumes on Transitions to 
Authoritarian Rule, the “facts,” while dismaying to everyone who, like herself, values “polit-
ical and economic egalitarianism, “are undeniable”: “Virtually none of the surviving transi-
tions to democracy that are discussed in this collection combined a significant redistribution 
of political and economic resources. In every enduring case, dramatic redistributions of 
property were postponed, circumscribed, or rolled back.” (Bermeo 1990, p. 365; see also 
Karl 1990).
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role of organized labor in Egypt and Tunisia also resembles the Latin 
American experiences. As the chapters by Abdalla and Karray (see Chaps. 5 
and 6, in this volume) show, key trade union organizations in both coun-
tries have been much more active in defending their (privileged) position 
than in trying to articulate a progressive socioeconomic agenda in the 
name of the broader popular sectors. In the case of Tunisia, this attitude is 
directly reflected in the tensions between the UGTT (at the national level) 
and the mobilization of unemployed people (see Chap. 8, in this volume). 
Even if these dimensions have not been studied in detail in this volume, it 
is also clear that (b) incumbent regime forces and elites, in general, were 
also key actors in the contested negotiations of political change in the two 
North African cases (see Boubekeur 2016; Roll 2016), and that (c) the 
international context—while certainly heterogeneous in terms of its politi-
cal implications—tended to support austerity policies and neoliberal 
reforms and, in any case, did not favor any kind of progressive socioeco-
nomic reform agenda (see Hinnebusch 2015; Paciello 2013; Teti 2012).
Second, in the “historic” context of politico-institutional change with 
socioeconomic continuity in Latin America, popular-sector organizations 
that had originally voiced socioeconomic demands either (a) joined the 
trend and likewise started to focus on politico-institutional issues, (b) tried 
to continue pushing for a broader socioeconomic agenda but faced increas-
ing fragmentation and marginalization from the political debate or (c) 
turned inward and/or to the local area and focused on survival strategies 
and self-help activities. The case studies included in this volume certainly 
do not cover (not nearly) the broad range of popular-sector organizations 
in Egypt and Tunisia, but the available evidence—again—reveals compa-
rable dynamics. In terms of (a), in the two post- revolutionary contexts, 
the Tunisian UGTT stands out as a labor organization that can be consid-
ered a relevant—and, indeed, quite powerful—political actor. But, as 
Karray’s chapter (see Chap. 5, in this volume) demonstrates, the UGTT’s 
role has been strong precisely as a participant in the politico- institutional 
transition process—at the expense of a socioeconomic agenda that, for 
instance, would have worked toward meeting specific workers’ demands. 
The issue of fragmentation and marginalization (b), which also showed up 
in the quantitative protest event analysis, has already been mentioned as a 
general feature in both countries, and it was particularly pronounced in 
the case of Egypt’s independent labor movement and the different types of 
unemployed mobilization in Tunisia. Finally (c), in different ways and 
forms, the case studies of the Egyptian Tuktuk drivers and the protests in 
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Tunisia’s Gafsa mining region revealed patterns of (partially contentious) 
interactions with the state that follow a rather “unpolitical”—localized and 
self-help-oriented—logic (see Chaps. 8 and 9 in this volume).
This last observation points to the third dynamic: the political conse-
quences of these patterns of contentious action. As already suggested, the 
overall phenomenon in both sets of cases is that socioeconomic grievances 
that contributed to motivating popular resistance to authoritarian regimes 
in the first place were not addressed and, correspondingly, socioeconomic 
contention continued—but it did (or does) so taking localized and/or 
fragmented, actor- and/or issue-specific forms that have a significant 
impact at the macropolitical level. As research on contentious action in 
Latin America’s post-transition democracies shows, the combination of 
persisting socioeconomic grievances with the opening of political oppor-
tunities in this region—surprisingly8—did not lead to ever-more escalating 
popular protest. Rather, what scholars have described is an overall process 
of “demobilization of the popular sectors” (Oxhorn 1998, p. 208) char-
acterized by an “angry atomization of society” (O’Donnell 1993, p. 1365) 
and erratic, short-lived expressions of discontent at the national level 
(Portes and Hoffman 2003, pp.  76–77), as well as new territorialized 
forms of popular-sector mobilization at the local level (Rossi 2017, 
pp. 13–15). Thus, the relative absence, or reduction, in popular protests, 
making socioeconomic claims at the national level did not imply satisfac-
tion, but rather reflected politico-economic dynamics that concern both 
the internal mechanisms of organization and mobilization among the 
popular sectors and their relationship with the broader political, economic 
and international context (see the two overview chapters on Latin America, 
Chaps. 4 and 7, in this volume). This is, in general terms, what we also 
find in post-revolutionary Egypt and Tunisia. More specifically, the case 
studies of Egypt’s independent labor movement and Tunisia’s unem-
ployed movement emphasized the internal weakness of existing popular- 
sector organizations, the lack of reliable and relevant sociopolitical allies 
and a political context that severely limited (Egypt) or limited to a relative 
degree (Tunisia) meaningful access to the political system.
8 In her 1989 book on Power and Popular Protest, Susan Eckstein (1989, p. 41) still specu-
lated that, in particular, in the context of open and thus protest-prone democratic regimes, 
the combination of increasing socioeconomic hardships due to region-wide economic crises 
and reduced state capacity for diffusing potential unrest with “patronage and subsidies” due 
to the austerity programs might lead to increasing levels of popular protest. See also 
O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986, pp. 52–53).
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As an overall result, it has been argued, with regard to Latin America, 
that in the end the non-responsivity to social grievances of the post- 
transition regimes proved instrumental for the stability of the post- 
transition regimes, as it helped avoid elite resistance to the “risks” that 
democratization posed for their privileges in terms of power and wealth 
(see Chaps. 4 and 7, in this volume). Although this was not studied in this 
volume, it is at least plausible to argue that democratization in Tunisia has 
benefited from a similar dynamic: In a context of significant mobilization 
around (class-based) socioeconomic cleavages, it certainly would have 
been hard to establish the kind of alliances that were key elements in the 
negotiated transition to democracy, such as the National Dialogue Quartet 
that united the UGTT and the Tunisian Confederation of Industry, Trade 
and Handicrafts (UTICA) or the different party coalitions that brought 
together an Islamist party with social-democratic parties or with a conser-
vative party alliance, respectively.
To be sure, these overall dynamics represent general patterns only. In the 
case of Latin America, in the 1980s and early 1990s, several countries saw 
quite important waves of socioeconomic contention. But these protests 
were, on the one hand, defensive reactions to austerity policies and neolib-
eral reforms rather than proactive moves demanding socioeconomic 
change—again something we can also observe in protest dynamics in Egypt 
and Tunisia. On the other hand, while governments in post- transition Latin 
America did frequently respond with repression, the ultimate failure of these 
protests to prevent the kinds of (neoliberal and/or austerity) policies they 
were fighting was not due to overwhelming state repression (see the two 
overview chapters on Latin America, Chaps. 4 and 7, in this volume).9 In 
the case of Egypt—which has (for the time being) seen the re-establishment 
of authoritarian rule, with levels of restrictions on civil society organizations 
that even exceed the pre-revolutionary situation—the political repression of 
(potentially) contentious actors is clearly a factor also evident in the low 
numbers of overall protests since the coup against Morsi (see Chap. 3, in 
this volume). Tunisia, for obvious reasons, much more closely resembles 
Latin America’s post-transition experiences in this regard.
9 As Eckstein (1989, p. 47) noted in the late 1980s, “Latin American governments do not 
have the material capability of employing force on a large scale unless financed from abroad, 
and the democratic countries in the region cannot, for ideological reasons, rely on prolonged 
and extensive use of force to rule.” Repression, under these conditions, tended to strengthen, 
rather than weaken, movements (Eckstein 1989, p. 46).
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10.4  contEntIous polItIcs In tImEs 
oF IncorporatIon crIsEs: thEorEtIcal rEFlEctIons
Comparing Egypt and Tunisia brings a remarkable pattern of similarities 
and differences to the fore. First, as we have seen, there is a quite high level 
of convergence between the two countries when it comes to the very char-
acteristics of the uprisings that culminated in the toppling of long- standing 
dictators in early 2011. Second, however, the trajectories of political trans-
formation after the revolutions are pointed in opposite directions. Third, 
these diverging political contexts notwithstanding, post-revolutionary 
Egypt and Tunisia again display quite similar patterns in economic policy-
making and, in general terms, in their respective lack of general structural 
economic change. Fourth, quantitative trends in socioeconomic protests 
are very different (clearly reflecting the differences in political opportunity 
structures rather than socioeconomic similarities). But, fifth, key qualita-
tive characteristics of these socioeconomic protests are again fairly similar 
(fragmented, territorialized, issue-specific, etc.), and this common weak-
ness is, sixth, reflected in the (limited and mainly status quo-oriented) 
consequences of these protests, which do not significantly reflect the dra-
matically different degrees of access to the political system that would be 
expected, given the diverging politico-institutional contexts.
In a nutshell, this pattern suggests that the politico-institutional con-
text significantly shapes the quantity and intensity of (socioeconomic) pro-
tests (as predicted by the contentious political approach), but that the 
qualitative characteristics of the socioeconomic protests, which have more 
immediate consequences in macropolitical terms, are shaped by different 
conditions. In order to make theoretical sense of this observation, it is 
again helpful to turn to an academic literature that has emerged in the 
comparative study of Latin American politics, namely the debate on the 
question of incorporation.
In a landmark study first published in 1991, Ruth and David Collier 
analyzed the historical processes through which the labor movement was 
initially incorporated into the political system during the first half of the 
twentieth century. Studying and comparing the cases of Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela, they identified 
different strategies and types of labor incorporation, which led to varying 
patterns of conflict and accommodation and produced long-lasting lega-
cies in terms of party system development and political regime dynamics 
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(Collier and Collier 2002).10 Recently, scholars have revived the concept 
of incorporation arguing that, since the 1990s, Latin America has been 
experiencing a new incorporation crisis that, with the so-called left turn, 
has given way to a “second historical process of mass political incorpora-
tion” (Roberts 2008, p. 300; see Luna and Filgueira 2009; Rossi 2015, 
2017; Silva 2017). In contrast to the first period of incorporation, the new 
period of incorporation involves a much more heterogeneous set of social 
groups that, in the Latin American debate, is usually called “the popular 
sectors.”11 Generally speaking, their incorporation has two dimensions: a 
political dimension that concerns the inclusion of popular-sector claims 
and interests into the political agenda as well as “the concrete mechanisms 
that link popular sector organizations to the political arena and policymak-
ing” (Silva 2017, p. 95; see also Rossi 2017, p. xi) and a socioeconomic 
dimension that refers to the substantive efforts at socioeconomic inclusion 
through the strengthening of socioeconomic rights and/or corresponding 
social and economic policies (Luna and Filgueira 2009, p. 375).
The recent wave of popular-sector struggles across Latin America, 
which in the first decade of the twenty-first century led to the election of 
a whole series of leftist and center-left governments, followed from the 
consequences of neoliberal reforms in two regards: On the one hand, the 
broken promise of neoliberal incorporation12 was a key driving force in the 
10 Studying the emergence of organized labor movements in Latin America as well as the 
varying responses of the state to this new phenomenon, Collier and Collier identified differ-
ent types and patterns of what they call the “initial incorporation” of the labor movement. 
As a critical juncture, the shape of this incorporation, then, was shown to have long-term 
effects on party systems and regime dynamics in the respective countries. Most notably, they 
distinguish between two different types of incorporation: In cases of state incorporation, 
“the legal and bureaucratic apparatus of the state” was the key agency of incorporation, “and 
the principal goal of the leaders who initiated incorporation was the control and depoliticiza-
tion of the labor movement”; in cases of party incorporation, by contrast, “a central agency 
of incorporation was a political party or political movement that later became a party, and a 
fundamental goal of political leaders, in addition to control, was the mobilization of working 
class support through this party of movement” (Collier and Collier 2002, p. 8).
11 Eduardo Silva defines the popular sectors as “poor subaltern social sectors,” including 
both “urban poor social groups in the formal and informal labor sectors” and “peasants, 
indigenous peoples, and other peoples of color in urban and rural spaces organized on socio-
territorial bases” (2017, p. 116, note 1).
12 Luna and Filgueira characterize Latin America’s pattern of (failed) incorporation in the 
1990s as “electoral incorporation in the context of faulty democracies and segmented market 
incorporation” and argue that “[n]eoliberalism did not fail simply because of its inability in 
most Latin American settings to achieve stable growth, wealth redistribution or market 
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upsurge of social (protest) movements that many Latin American coun-
tries have experienced since the late 1990s (see Roberts 2008). On the 
other hand, neoliberal reforms generally meant a process of “disincorpora-
tion” of organized labor, which saw itself dramatically weakened both in 
socioeconomic and in political terms (Rossi 2017, pp. 15–17); in general, 
the “fragmented, heterogeneous popular sector landscape,” from which 
new dynamics of contentious mobilization have emerged since the late 
1990s, were very much the socio-structural result of neoliberalism (Silva 
2017, p. 95).13 These popular sectors, while formally empowered by the 
establishment of democratic regimes during the long 1980s, were de facto 
marginalized in both political and socioeconomic terms in the context of 
democratization-cum-neoliberal reforms (see Kurtz 2004; Oxhorn 1998; 
Wolff 2005, pp. 62–67, 2007, pp. 10–13).
The election of left and center-left governments across the region as 
well as the series of socioeconomic and politico-institutional changes that 
this left turn has brought about can, therefore, be understood “as both 
the outcomes of, and a set of alternative solutions to, a ‘second incorpora-
tion crisis’” (Luna and Filgueira 2009, p.  372). Important differences 
between the left and center-left governments that came to power in many 
Latin American countries in the early 2000s notwithstanding, their overall 
agenda has combined (a) a turn to post-neoliberal social and economic 
policies that aimed at socioeconomic incorporation of the popular sectors 
(basically, by reducing poverty and income inequality) and (b) varying 
attempts to politically incorporate the popular sectors (via popular-sector 
organizations such as labor unions or social movement organizations rep-
resenting, for instance, indigenous or unemployed people; via leftist and/
or movement-type political parties; via new mechanisms of participatory 
and/or plebiscitary democracy).
In the context of this concluding chapter, it is impossible to discuss the 
specific patterns and actual outcomes of incorporation in Latin America 
(see Rossi 2017; Silva and Rossi 2018; Wolff 2018). Suffice it to say that 
progress in terms of both socioeconomic and political inclusion was diverse 
but real. Yet, it remained relative only and its sustainability doubtful, given 
incorporation, but also because it was unable to structure political incorporation by provid-
ing legitimate representation (i.e., by delivering policies and outcomes that were able to 
synchronise collective expectations and individual needs)” (2009, p. 376).
13 To be sure, neoliberal structural adjustment in this regard combined with austerity poli-
cies, monetary stabilization measures, the effects of the severe economic crisis of the 1980s, 
as well as with the consequences of the military dictatorships.
10 FROM NORTH AFRICA TO LATIN AMERICA AND BACK… 
264
that socioeconomic inclusion depended to an important extent on high 
commodity prices, while political inclusion frequently depended on infor-
mal mechanisms. In sum, therefore, the crisis of incorporation which has 
underlain Latin America’s “leftist turn” is, thus, far from resolved. What is 
relevant for our purposes, however, is the overall idea of incorporation 
periods—incorporation crises and attempted solutions of such crises—
which result from basic socio-structural changes (but, to be sure, have to 
be activated through processes of social mobilization). As we will suggest 
in the following, considering them as expressions of a fundamental crisis 
of incorporation helps to make sense of the empirical observations col-
lected in this volume.
In fact, the Arab uprisings have already been interpreted as resulting 
from the breakdown of an “authoritarian social contract” that had sus-
tained the autocratic regimes in the region for many decades (see Achy 
2015; Guazzone and Pioppi 2012; Zorob 2013). Generally speaking, this 
social contract (in Egypt and Tunisia but also elsewhere in the region) 
involved key mechanisms of incorporation: In political terms, state corpo-
ratism was a key feature which basically connected organized labor with 
the political arena through a state-controlled and co-opted labor move-
ment (other mechanisms of political incorporation included, for instance, 
parliaments that, in the same way, served to connect key constituencies to 
the political regime, see Weipert-Fenner 2015). In socioeconomic terms, 
research has particularly highlighted the material benefits offered by the 
authoritarian regimes (jobs in the public sector, social security, social sub-
sidies, etc.). With neoliberal structural adjustment, this authoritarian social 
contract gradually lost its material basis, while (partially related) changes 
in the social and economic structures of the countries meant that corpo-
ratist arrangements reached a decreasing share of the popular sectors. The 
resulting crisis of incorporation has become manifest with the rise of an 
independent labor movement in Egypt since 2006, the 2008 protests in 
Tunisia’s Gafsa region and, finally, with the uprisings of 2010–2011.
As our analysis of post-revolutionary dynamics in Egypt and Tunisia 
shows, these old mechanisms of incorporation still exist. Furthermore, key 
ideological elements of the authoritarian social contract continue to shape 
the popular discourses and agendas of key actors (as exemplified by Tunisia’s 
unemployed protests and their primary demand to be hired by the state). 
Yet, a persisting crisis of incorporation is hard to deny. Post- revolutionary 
developments have, therefore, not meant a re-establishment of the earlier 
scheme of incorporation. The extremely repressive turn in the Egyptian 
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government’s relationship with civil society actors, on the one hand, and 
the extent of public discontent as well as the recent outbursts of socioeco-
nomic protests in Tunisia, on the other hand, clearly suggest that existing 
(“old”) mechanisms of incorporation reach only a limited (privileged) part 
of the popular sectors, and they do so in increasingly precarious ways. The 
extent and reach of socioeconomic incorporation—through, for instance, 
socioeconomic measures (public sector jobs, subsidies)—is clearly insuffi-
cient. The same holds true for the politico- institutional dimension, where, 
for instance, the corporatist inclusion of organized labor is not only highly 
exclusive and state-controlled but is also largely formal, without enabling 
any kind of substantive influence on policymaking.
At the same time, however, new mechanisms of incorporation—which 
might enable a new social contract—have yet to emerge. Rather, as in 
Latin America in the 1980s and 1990s, current dynamics in Egypt and 
Tunisia fluctuate between (or combine) neoliberal approaches that 
emphasize inclusion “by and through the market” and fairly traditional 
state- centered and state-corporatist approaches. In the case of Tunisia, 
the idea of a “social dialogue,” which has been promoted by the UGTT 
and which basically represents an attempt to revise corporatist incorpora-
tion in the new context, cautiously points in a more innovative direction. 
But, generally, our case studies document little to no new dynamics of 
incorporation. In different ways and gradations, this lack of any institu-
tional articulation with the political arena can be observed in the case of 
the unemployed protests in Gafsa and the Tuktuk drivers in Egypt, that 
is, in the informal sectors of the countries but also in the labor activism 
in Egypt that is continuing despite the banning of independent labor 
unions and the renewed co-optation of the official labor union (Hamzawy 
2017). Clearly, those large parts of the population that are outside the 
formal labor market are entirely excluded from existing mechanisms of 
incorporation but also important groups of formally employed people 
are not or are only indirectly or ephemerally part of corporatist interest 
intermediation.
To what extent does this interpretation of the post-revolutionary set-
ting—as an incorporation crisis that openly broke out with the uprisings 
and has yet to be addressed—help understand the puzzling similarities and 
differences between Egypt and Tunisia? First, the notion of a persisting 
crisis of incorporation points to a common feature that characterizes polit-
ical developments in the two countries. While the development of the 
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political regimes in a narrow sense has taken divergent trajectories, the 
ways in which these emerging regimes incorporate (or do not incorporate) 
the popular sectors and their organizations reveal some important similari-
ties. In democratic Tunisia, as in authoritarian Egypt, institutionalized 
access of popular-sector organizations to the political arena is as limited as 
the political responsiveness to their concerns. This similarity across differ-
ent political regimes is hardly surprising when the Latin American experi-
ence is taken into account: The establishment of representative democracy 
does not automatically imply a process of popular-sector incorporation. In 
their comparison of Egypt and Tunisia, Adly and Meddeb (see Chap. 2, in 
this volume) therefore basically confirm what research on Latin America’s 
post-transition democracies has established: That changes in the set-up of 
political institutions and the formal granting of universal political and civil 
rights as implied by democratization can perfectly coexist with far- reaching 
continuities in social power relations, which will, then, most probably also 
be reflected in the overall characteristics of social and economic policies 
(see Kurtz 2004; Oxhorn 1998; Wolff 2005).
Second, the dynamics of socioeconomic protests and their political 
relevance are also shaped by the underlying crisis of incorporation that 
particularly concerns the heterogeneous set of social groups that make 
up the popular sectors. Expressing the ongoing struggles for incorpora-
tion, protests continue with ebbs and flows in both countries and, in the 
much more open Tunisian context, with fairly dramatic outbursts of dis-
content. But, given the heterogeneity of the social groups and the frag-
mentation of the popular-sector organizations involved, these protests 
neither force authorities to respond with offers of meaningful incorpora-
tion nor do they accumulate into broader waves of contention that 
would (once again) challenge the political regimes. The different quan-
titative dynamics of socioeconomic protests in Egypt and Tunisia thus 
reflect the differences in the political opportunity structures, but the 
similar quality—and hence a similarly low degree of political relevance—
of the protests is arguably related to the socio-structural and organiza-
tional set-up of the popular sectors. As in the Latin American 1990s, 
these characteristics of  popular- sector mobilization reflect the combined 
legacies of decades of authoritarian rule and neoliberal structural adjust-
ment. In sum, therefore, recognizing the unaddressed crisis of popular-
sector incorporation helps explain key dynamics in contentious politics 
in Egypt and Tunisia.
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10.5  outlook
At the end of the 1980s, a volume on Power and Popular Protest in Latin 
America started with the observation that “Latin Americans have been 
more defiant than the available literature would lead us to believe, even if 
less so than we might expect, given existing injustices and inequities” 
(Eckstein 1989, p. 3). The same kind of statement could well have started 
our analysis of socioeconomic protest in Egypt and Tunisia: The Arab 
uprisings of 2010–2011 and what has happened ever since clearly show 
that the people in the region are more defiant than previous assessments 
of Arab exceptionalism and authoritarian persistence suggested, even if 
less defiant than we might expect, given persisting injustices and inequi-
ties. In Latin America, it took roughly two decades until the failure of 
post-transitional (democratic) regimes to do anything about the persisting 
(if not aggravating) injustices and inequities led to a renewed wave of 
popular mobilization that placed the social question back on the agenda. 
In the early 2000s, this new upsurge in sociopolitical mobilization in Latin 
America ushered in a period of remarkable political and socioeconomic 
change in which left and center-left governments adopted more inclusive 
and redistributive (“post-neoliberal”) social and economic policies and, 
contradictions and limitations notwithstanding, achieved significant 
reductions in poverty and inequality (see Huber and Stephens 2012; 
Levitsky and Roberts 2011; Rossi 2017; Silva and Rossi 2018).
In this concluding chapter, we have argued that Egypt and Tunisia—
and plausibly broader parts of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) 
region as well—are currently confronting a crisis of popular-sector incor-
poration that is fairly similar to the one Latin America has been facing since 
the 1980s (and which is still far from resolved in that region). Large parts 
of the population—namely those representing the lower strata of society—
do not have access to effective mechanisms that link them with the political 
arena, give them an institutional voice in the political process and/or make 
policymaking responsive to their interests and values. With the popular 
uprisings of 2010–2011, this lack of incorporation, which reflects the 
breakdown of the previous scheme of incorporation (the “authoritarian 
social contract”), turned into a full-fledged crisis. In both post-revolution-
ary contexts studied in this volume, governments have been unwilling to 
establish new processes for incorporating organizations representing the 
popular sectors, while the latter have been mostly unable to apply pressure 
for their incorporation from below. This dynamic is remarkably similar in 
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Egypt and Tunisia, despite the different political regimes that have taken 
shape in the two countries. This observation reinforces our argument that 
we are confronted here with underlying social (sociopolitical and politico-
economic) dynamics that shape contentious politics and are relatively inde-
pendent of changes at the level of the political system.
What are we to make of this overall assessment? The idea behind the 
interregional comparative perspective is definitely not that Latin America, 
as a somewhat more advanced region, serves to demonstrate to North 
Africa or the Arab world “the image of its own future,” to paraphrase Karl 
Marx. This story is neither about late developers repeating the experiences 
of others, nor about models that might be exported. But, by being capital-
ist societies with a peripheral place in the global political economy in times 
of neoliberal globalization, Latin America and North Africa are part of 
global processes of social change and, at the same time, are experiencing 
processes of domestic social change that can be expected to exhibit certain 
common features. It is in this sense that it is promising to speculate that 
Egypt and Tunisia are undergoing a period of contested incorporation 
that is structurally similar to the one that Latin America has been experi-
encing since the 1990s. This analogy, in addition to helping us make sense 
of the empirical phenomena studied in this volume, raises three important 
questions that might be crucial for the future of Egypt and Tunisia (and 
the Arab world, more generally speaking), and with which we want to 
conclude this book.
First, with a view to future academic research, it seems promising to 
systematically address the question of incorporation (periods, crises and 
attempts) from an interregional comparative perspective. Informed by 
what we know from Latin America about mechanisms and patterns, 
demands and struggles, outcomes and problems of popular-sector incor-
poration, such a research agenda would study in detail the shifts and 
continuities in the ways in which different segments of the popular sec-
tors in the MENA region create or use links with the political arena to 
make their demands heard and in which, stated the other way round, 
states and  political parties use, establish or adapt links with the popular 
sectors. From an interregional comparative perspective, one key ques-
tion is whether we can identify new dynamics of popular-sector incorpo-
ration in the MENA region that might offer (competing, more or less 
promising) solutions to the incorporation crisis. Such new dynamics in 
the MENA region may emerge from below, from the very place where 
 I. WEIPERT-FENNER AND J. WOLFF
269
popular-sector groups organize and act collectively or from above, as 
political responses to challenges from below. In the end, however, they 
will result from contentious politics dynamics in which social agency 
from below interacts with macropolitical dynamics from above. In any 
case, the dynamics that may already be underway in the MENA region 
will most certainly be very different from the ones observed in the con-
text of Latin America’s “left turn.” But, as we have suggested in this 
concluding chapter, they respond to fairly similar social and political 
challenges and will, therefore, probably be characterized by structural 
similarities and/or functional equivalents.
Going beyond such a descriptive research agenda, a second—and related 
—question obviously concerns the conditions and factors that might 
enable or activate new dynamics of popular-sector incorporation in the 
MENA region in general, and in Egypt and Tunisia in particular. Again, 
Latin American experiences do not offer a direct answer to this question, 
but still might be worth considering. As briefly summarized in the second 
overview chapter by Jonas Wolff (see Chap. 7, in this volume), scholars 
have explained the recent re-emergence of strong popular-sector move-
ments in Latin America, which prepared the ground for the “left turn,” by 
emphasizing the necessary combination of macro- and micro- conditions. 
To recap: The opportunity and the motive to mobilize were constituted by 
the overall political space offered by democracy as well as by the mobiliz-
ing threats implied by neoliberal reforms and austerity policies. Yet, in 
terms of the capacity to organize and act collectively, associational spaces 
and pre-existing societal networks at the local level as well as horizontal 
networks and communication across different local settings were crucial in 
enabling popular-sector groups to effectively seize the opportunities and 
respond to the threats (see Silva 2009; Wolff 2007; Yashar 2005).
Third, the question of incorporation is far from a purely academic 
issue. As the comparative scholarship on the different periods of mass 
incorporation in Latin America demonstrates, the patterns and dynamics 
of incorporation are of the utmost political importance. The ways in 
which the popular sectors are or are not incorporated have immediate 
and long-term consequences for party system development and political 
regime dynamics as well as for political stability and societal peace. This 
means that it is not only generally important to search for ways in which, 
say, unemployed people in Tunisia or shantytown dwellers in Egypt can 
gain an institutionalized voice in the political arena, it will also be crucial 
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for political developments in these countries how they might eventually 
do so: whether by means of relatively autonomous social movements or 
the expansion of existing (labor) organizations, or through old or new, 
leftist, Islamist or whatever-kind-of parties or through state institutions 
and agencies. Recognizing the manifold experiences from Latin America 
in this regard may enable academics, politicians and activists to identify 
promising attempts to facilitate popular-sector incorporation that emerge 
in Egypt, Tunisia and beyond, as well as ways of promoting innovation 
in popular- sector incorporation from the outside at an early stage. To 
mention only one specific lesson from Latin America, promising experi-
ments in popular- sector incorporation might particularly emerge in local 
settings, at the municipal level, where it is easier for social movements to 
establish direct and organic links with the political arena (see Goldfrank 
2011; Van Cott 2008). In terms of political reforms, this raises the issue 
of decentralization and the question how to enable or deepen political 
participation at the local level.
All this is not to say that it is irrelevant whether representative democ-
racy exists, whether individual human rights are respected or whether civil 
society actors in general can act autonomously and have access to the 
political arena. All this is certainly of crucial importance in many regards.14 
But, as the focus on socioeconomic protests shows all too well, the struc-
tural inequalities that characterize societies in the Arab world as in Latin 
America (or, for that matter, Europe) also demand a perspective that takes 
social class and power relations seriously. As Ruth Collier concluded in her 
study on the role of the working class during democratization processes in 
Western Europe and Latin America, in times of political transformation, it 
is not “transition games but political economy [that] becomes crucially 
important” (Collier 1999, p. 197). In normative terms, such a perspective 
should specifically zoom in on those sectors of society that are struggling 
for survival, political empowerment and social justice from a disadvan-
taged position—and whose success is, therefore, of particular relevance 
when it comes to constructing societies that are both politically more 
democratic and socially more just.
14 In fact, as mentioned above, scholars have emphasized the relevance of the overall politi-
cal space offered by representative democracy—even if this opportunity structure was, obvi-
ously, only an enabling condition (see Levitsky and Roberts 2011; Wolff 2007; Yashar 2005).
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